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OBJECTIONABLE WORK IN ISRAEL
Amir Paz-Fuchst
I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Israeli Law Review, the
oldest Israeli law journal published in English, chose to dedicate two
special issues to matters that fall on opposite ends of the socio-legal
realm. The first special issue of the Israeli Law Review, in 1989,
focused on torture -a practice that cannot be implemented without a
high degree of deference and conformity.1 The other special issue,
published in 2002, was dedicated to the matter of conscientious
objection (CO) in the context of military service in the Israeli Defense
Forces.2 Between the two lie the day-to-day lives of Israeli society,
normality within a reality of extremes, an intense mixture of
conformity and radicalism, secularism and fundamentalism.
This context is important to the matter at hand. Legal
reasoning-"ordinary reasoning applied to law"-in one sphere is
intimately related to legal reasoning in another sphere.3 Insofar as the
case at hand is concerned, decades of social and legal preoccupation
with matters of CO that relate to military engagement in general4 and
to specific military decrees in particular5 have formed a body of
jurisprudence with respect to the limits of tolerance to
"comprehensive doctrines," a term defined by John Rawls to include
t Senior Lecturer, Ono Academic College. Thanks to Neta Nadiv for excellent research
assistance.
1. Miriam Gur-Arye, Landau Commission Report, 23 ISR. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 141
(1989). See Alan Dershowitz, Is it Necessary to Apply "Physical Pressure" to Terrorists, and to
Lie About it?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 192 (1989); Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission
Report-Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of the
Security Service, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216 (1989); Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23
ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989).
2. Barak Medina & David Weisbrod, Refusals to Serve-Political Dissent in the Israel
Defense Force, 36 ISR. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2002).
3. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 31
(2008).
4. See David Enoch, Some Arguments Against Conscientious Objection and Civil
Disobedience Refuted, 36 ISR. L. REV. 227 (2002).
5. See Amir Paz-Fuchs & Michael Sfard, The Fallacies of Objection to Selective
Conscientious Objection, 36 ISR. L. REV. 111 (2002).
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"conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal
character. ,6
Therefore, in the Israeli context at least, military CO serves as a
seemingly convenient background for a discussion of objectionable
work. However, while the themes are similar, we should be wary not
to force the analogy. Indeed, it may be that the dissimilarities
between CO in the military and in the employment relationship map
the relevant factors that this article will address. First, the order to
perform "objectionable work" may come from a private enterprise or
from a public sector employer. The military conscientious objector,
on the other hand, always faces the power of the state. In other
words, one should ask if a distinction is, or should be, drawn between
the public sector in general, the public sector employer, and a private
sector employer.
Another matter concerning the peripheral rights may or may not
be mixed in the fray. While the military conscientious objector
presents the clear case of the limits of conscientious objection, the
employee's refusal to perform an employer's directive is often (if not
even better) understood in terms of other rights, such as privacy,
freedom of speech, and equal protection. In addition, the
employment contract (obviously irrelevant in the military context)
may also impact the limits and justification of objection to particular
directives set by the employer.
Finally, consideration will be given to the legal remedy sought.
While the military conscientious objector seeks to be exempted from a
particular engagement, or from conscription altogether, the range of
remedies that the court considers in objectionable work issues is much
wider. More importantly, as we will see, there is a strong inter-
relationship between the remedy that the court is considering and its
willingness to accept the substantive charge.
Before trying to decipher the Israeli jurisprudence on this matter,
a qualification is in order: while this paper will discuss all the Israeli
cases dealing with objectionable work, their number, over the course
of Israel's relatively young legal system, is not overwhelming. An
analysis of the themes identified above (the background to the
objection, the public or private nature of the employer, and the
remedy sought) with the background of one or two relevant cases at a
time should be done with caution. Naturally, each case involves
overlapping themes, thus making it difficult to pinpoint the
determining factor of the judicial decision. For this reason, I will
6. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 13, 175 (1996).
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make use of some related case law that does not always deal with
objectionable work strictu sensu, to support the normative
assumptions that underlie the cases.
II. GROUNDS FOR OBJECTIONS
Are Israeli courts more receptive to claims for exemption on the
grounds of religious CO than on other grounds of CO? On the face of
it, such a distinction seems ill-founded. Both secular and religious
objections surely may have "sufficient 'cogency, seriousness, cohesion
and importance' to warrant protection."7 Mark Freedland and Lucy
Vickers note that, under European law, "it is clear" that political
beliefs, atheism and other non-religious viewpoints are covered.8
Yet, an interesting judgment delivered by the Israeli High Court
of Justice (HCJ) in 2004 suggests that such a distinction, indeed,
exists. In Milo v. Minister of Defense,9 the HCJ had to deal, for the
first time, with the case of a female conscientious objector whose
request for exemption from military service was related to moral
reservations, concerned with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza (at the time), and not to religious grounds. This matter is
important, since Israeli law allows women, but not men, to be
exempted on "conscientious or religious grounds."' °  The HCJ
preferred to interpret "conscientious grounds" in a way that required
evidence of religious or traditional constraints that prevent a woman
from performing military service." The judgment was criticized
because it opted for an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of a rare
statutory exemption on the grounds of conscience, and one that could
easily include secular grounds. 2
While the analogy to objectionable work is important, its
consequences are not straightforward. One could surmise that
institutional experience with CO in life-threatening situations would
lead to greater tolerance in cases that are much more mundane in
7. Mark Freedland & Lucy Vickers, Religious Expression in the Workplace in the United
Kingdom, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 597, 601 (2009) (citing X, Y and Z v. U.K. (1982) 31 DR
50 (U.K.)); see also Campbell and Cosans v. U.K., 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 293 (1982) (U.K).
8. Freedland & Vickers, supra note 7, at 601; see also Yossi Nehushtan, Secular and
Religious Conscientious Exemptions: Between Tolerance and Equality, in LAW AND RELIGION
IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 243, 245 (Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans & Zoe
Robinson eds., 2008).
9. HCJ 2383/04 Milo v. Minister of Defence [2004] IsrSC 59(1) 66.
10. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, S.H. 39(c) (Isr.).
11. Milo, IsrSC 59(1), at 186.
12. Daphne Barak-Erez, On Women Pilots and Women Conscientious Objectors: One
Battle or Different Ones?, STUDIES IN FEMINISM, GENDER AND LAW 65, 95 (2007) [in Hebrew].
2010]
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comparison. This rationale would suggest that if the legal system is
willing to tolerate a limited range of acts of CO in the military context,
the scope of motives that would be deemed legitimate would plausibly
be greater in employment and social security matters.
On the other hand, we may find that courts would view
"objectionable work" cases as trivial in comparison. The courts may
prefer to address sensitive constitutional dilemmas only in the most
extreme cases of political friction, thus dismissing claims for
ideological exceptions in cases that deal with, for example, the
employment relationship. 3
A sense of the judicial attitude may be gained by comparing two
cases. In Irit Aroussi v. the Employment Agency, a claimant of
unemployment insurance was referred by the Employment Agency to
a job as a seamstress in a clothing shop. 4 When she approached the
employer, she realized that the work would involve sewing
"immodest" clothing. Being an orthodox Jew, she sought guidance
from the municipal Chief Rabbi, who submitted an opinion to the
Court, stating that
sewing immodest clothing is tantamount to aiding and abetting a
crime. According to Jewish rule (Halacha) a person is not allowed
to perform an act that assists others to commit a crime. Immodest
clothing is an offence by the woman who wears them and by men
who see what should not be seen. She who sews such clothing
therefore aids the commission of many offences.
The Employment Agency objected that Jewish law was not the
law of the land, and that the relevant provision in the National
Insurance Law, section 163, stated that a claimant must accept job
offers under particular conditions (the job the claimant performed
over the past three years, a wage that is not less than his
unemployment benefits, etc.), but these do not include conscientious
or religious objections. The regional Labor Court accepted the
claimant's position in a strikingly brief judgment, stating that "it is
clear that a person cannot be required to perform work that would
require him or her to perform offences according to the tenets of the
religion he or she lives by."
The second case involved the rights of journalists to refuse to
comply with a new editorial line, which was initiated by a takeover of
13. The American Supreme Court, for example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) was clearly more favorable to exemptions that stem from religious motivations. The
Court stated that "subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority" in a manner that rests on "philosophical and personal [choice] rather
than religious" would not allow for legal exemption. Id.
14. AV 7262/00 Irit Aroussi v. The Employment Agency [2002] (translation by author).
474
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the paper. 5 The Jerusalem (formerly Palestine) Post, a left-leaning
paper owned by the Israeli General Union (the Histadrust), was sold
in 1989 to a group of conservative tycoons, including Conrad Black
and Robert Maxwell. Following the takeover, the journalists felt
increased pressure to change the paper's agenda. They resigned and
demanded redundancy pay, normally awarded to employees who are
dismissed, but not to those who resign. The National Labor Court's
(NLC) decision here was much more nuanced than the one described
above.
On the one hand, the NLC ruled that the owner of a paper may
instruct a journalist to write an article on a matter that the owner sees
fit, and may offer the journalist guidelines for the expected result.
Under Israeli law, an employee is entitled to redundancy pay when
"conditions of work are such that he should not be expected to
continue working."' 6 Citing the case of Shemli v. Israeli Communist
Party,17 the NLC ruled that "a person's position on matters of state,
society, economy, etc. does not constitute 'conditions of work' in the
sense of section 11."'" Moreover, the employee "may not refuse to
write the piece just as an associate in a law firm cannot decide which
clients he will handle and which client he will refuse to handle." 9
On the other hand, the NLC states that the above does not hold
"when the employer's instructions conflict with the law, ethics or with
his conscience. 20 The NLC refers, by way of example, to section 318
of the Israeli Penal Code of 1977, that states that a doctor "does not
have to perform an abortion if the act conflicts with his conscience."
This rare exception is interesting in and of itself, but it is not clear how
relevant it is to the case at hand. First, the doctor in question would
probably be faced with a request from a patient, and not a demand
from an employer. Second, and more importantly from a legal
perspective, the exemption here is stated explicitly in legislation.
Does the same apply when no such legislation exists? The court's
decision is unclear. The NLC clarifies that the owner's freedom of
speech grants him the right to choose an editor and journalists as he
sees fit, and if "their style, bias or political opinion are not to his
liking"-he may terminate their employment.2
15. NLR 93/3-223 Palestine Post v. Yehiyel [1994] 27 PDA 436 (translation by author).
16. Severance Pay Law, 1963, S.H. 11(a).
17. NLC Judgments, Shemli v. Israeli Communist Party [19741 6, 42 (translation by author).
18. Id. at 447.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 449.
2010]
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Yet, as sometimes occurs, the whole does not necessarily include
its parts.22 While the employee's political opinion may serve as
grounds for dismissal, it does not legitimize meddling. The NLC
states that if the publisher decided not to fire an editor, he cannot
intervene in the latter's work on a regular basis, because that would
undermine the editor's freedom of expression.
Therefore, the difference between the courts' decisions in the two
cases may be explained on the grounds for CO: religious doctrine, in
the first case, and political opinion, in the second. A different
perspective is also possible. In the first case, the nature of the legal
dispute posited the individual and the state on opposing sides.
Alternatively, the second case involved two private actors. A related
matter is the fact that the legal remedy sought in each case was quite
distinct. We turn to these matters below.
III. THE EMPLOYER: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
When mapping the factors that should be considered in
objectionable work cases, the identity of the defendant as part of the
public sector or the private sector is quite relevant. The reason for
this distinction is that "where the employer can be viewed as part of
the public sector there may be additional factors that affect the
question of the proportionality of any restrictions on non-
discrimination rights., 23
The reason for this distinction may be obvious, but should be
explicitly mentioned. It is quite common, especially among those who
are not labor law scholars,24 to think of the private sector workplace as
part of the "free market," as "quintessentially private" and, thus, as
legitimating regulation only in exceptional cases of market failure.'
The public sector, on the other hand, is not part of the economic
market and therefore may legitimately pursue other goals.
Specifically, these goals may include granting little weight to profit
maximization, and though constraints of efficient government are and
should be taken into account, "government cannot be run just like a
business in part because its elaborate procedures are meant to
22- Cf W. Union Tele. Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 1, 53 (1910). For further elaboration on this
theme, see Amir Paz-Fuchs, Rights, Duties and Conditioning Welfare, 21 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 175,
192-93 (2008).
23. Freedland & Vickers, supra note 7, at 618.
24. Hugh Collins, Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment
Relation, in HUGH COLLINS, PAUL DAVIES & ROGER RIDEOUT, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION 3 (2000)
25. Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6,8 (1988).
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produce something else besides the specific services that the private
sector provides."26 Therefore, it would stand to reason that the public
service, which is charged with the advancement of public interests,
would take some of these interests into account when acting as an
employer. If government, in general, aims to advance, for example,
equality and freedom of conscience, it would make sense that it does
so also in its role as a public sector employer. Focusing on religious
freedom, Freedland and Vickers note that "public sector employers
may need to provide a level of protection to religious interests in
order to uphold the public policy of promoting diversity. ' 27  In
addition to promoting diversity, it should be remembered that the
public sector serves as a monopoly of sorts where certain occupations
are concerned. Thus, for example, since all police officers and
teachers in Israel are employed in the public sector or in organizations
funded by the public fisc, forcing them to perform acts that, for them,
are unconscionable, may compel them to leave their occupation
altogether. While this consideration was not serious enough for
Justice Holmes when he quipped that "a policeman may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman," one may wonder whether this comment is
misleading.' The state's ability to attach unconstitutional conditions
to employment is, in fact, quite troubling when no parallel alternatives
exist."
Arguably, however, this logic goes both ways. Indeed, the NLC
in Palestine Post stated that a paper's refusal to publish a journalist's
contributions does not violate his freedom of speech, since he may
"find himself another platform, or even establish a new one." 3 It may
be suggested, then, that the private employer's ability to set the terms
of employment, including the ability to demand, what the employee
deems to be, objectionable work is greater because of the employee's
ability to work elsewhere. Yet, it is not unrestrained. The courts
seem more inclined to limit the employer's prerogative where
freedom of conscience is buttressed with additional concerns that
favor the employee's case, such as constitutional rights (other than
freedom of conscience), and the contract of employment.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Freedland & Vickers, supra note 7, at 618.
28. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
29. AMIR PAZ-FUCHS, WELFARE TO WORK: CONDITIONAL RIGHTS IN SOCIAL POLICY
chs. 3 & 4 (2008); G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 117 (2000).
30. NLC 93/3-223 Palestine Post vs. Yehiyel [1994] 27 PDA 436, 452 (translation by author).
20101
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IV. CONSCIENCE, CONTRACT, AND RIGHTS
In Shemli,31 four employees of the Israel Communist Party asked
to resign because they felt that the party changed its ideological
position significantly following the war of 1967. They asked to receive
redundancy payments as if they were dismissed. The party's position
was, first, that it was the party that remained true, while the
employees distanced themselves from the Communist ideals. Second,
the party's code dictated that an employee must accept and adopt the
party line, including ideological, political, and organizational loyalty.
As noted above, the NLC began by stating that, in general, a person's
positions on matters of state, society, religion, or economics are not
"considerations of employment relations" that justify granting
redundancy pay to an employee who voluntarily quit his job.32
However, this was not the NLC's final word on the matter. The court
continued: "the situation is different when the employee is accepted to
a job, and the employee agrees to work, specifically because he holds
a particular religious or political position, and the ideological
identification is one of the preconditions, if not the main precondition,
for the establishment of the employment relation."33
Deciding in favor of the employees, the court clarified that in
cases where such an ideological precondition exists, the identification
operates in reciprocal fashion. In other words, just as the employer
should not be expected to work with the employee who has had a
change of heart, an employee should not be forced to continue
working for an employer whose political, religious, or social affinities
have changed. For this reason, the court found the question of blame
(which side "remained true" and which change political allegiance) to
be irrelevant.
The Shemli case suggests that the personal employment contract
and the preconditions that underlie it, whether explicitly or implicitly
articulated, may set the limits on an employer's prerogative to
demand performance of objectionable work?4 Yet, does the same
logic work in both directions?
Tzipi Yaacobi v. Proportion Ltd.35 involved the case of an
employee who worked for a private cosmetic surgery facility for over
31. NLC Judgments, Shemli v. Israeli Communist Party [1974] 6,42 (translation by author).
32- Id. at 44-45.
33. Id. at 45.
34. On implied terms, see MARK FREEDLAND, THE PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACr
115 (2003).
35. Labor Case (TA) 9465/05 Tzipy Yaacobi v. Proportion Ltd. [2008] (translation by
author).
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five years. It was revealed that, as a matter of common practice,
employees in Proportion were requested to discuss the facelift
procedure that they had undergone with clients, as a way of
persuading them in their deliberations. At some stage, Yaacobi had a
change of heart, and decided that she would not divulge such
information. Her manager dismissed her the following day and
Yaacobi filed for damages.
Should the employee's prior consent to this questionable practice
bind her to continue a practice that she feels uncomfortable with, to
say the least? The court did not think so. Expounding a fundamental
paradigm of employment law jurisprudence, the court stated
relying on the employee's consent is not enough. The employee's
unequal bargaining power, relative to the employer, means that in
many occasions, his consent is not true consent. Here, it was the
employer's initiative to present personal details. As such, we may
see the "consent" as an improper use of bargaining power by the
employer towards the employee.36
Strong words indeed. So strong, in fact, that one wonders if the
court would have reached the same conclusion if the employee's
conscientious objection was not supported by another constitutional
right-the right to privacy. While Yaacobi's personal reservations
motivated her to refuse the manager's order, the court's emphasis was
on the violation of her right to privacy.
This is not to say that the court's reliance on the right to privacy
is forced. The International Labour Office (ILO) adopted a broad
definition to the term: "Privacy is a broad value, representing
concerns about autonomy, individuality, personal space, intimacy,
anonymity and a host of related concerns."37 Israeli labor courts have
been confronted, on a number of occasions, with the need to set the
balance between the employer's dictate and the employee's right to
privacy. Most prominently, these matters concern the requirement to
undergo health, psychological, and personality testing.38 Since such
tests are often preconditions to employment, and not part of the job
itself, they are not the focus of this paper. Yet, the fact that most
challenges to such practices were not successful is instructive. The
36. Id.
37. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Workers' Privacy: Part H" Monitoring and Surveillance in the
Workplace, 12 CONDITIONS OF WORK DIGEST 10 (1993).
38. HCJ 826/89 Gen. Union of Workers v. Nat'l Labor Court of Israel [1989] IsrSC 43(4), at
745 (translation by author); Labor Appeal 43/3-33 Sofer v. Dead Sea Indus. Ltd. Labor [1993]
NLC 26(1), 169 (translation by author); Labor Appeal 48/3-169 Public Sector Worker's Union v.
State of Israel [1989] NLC 21, 38. See MATTHEW FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 19-
54 (1995).
2010]
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courts found that the employee's right to privacy could not serve as
sufficient grounds for challenging the employer's business interest in
accepting a healthy, competent employee. Only in one case, where
the test of the employee's physical condition was found to be too
intrusive, did the court intervene.39
In sum, where the employment contract, or the employee's
constitutional right, is bound together with the employee's CO, the
case appears to be stronger. As may be expected, the employee's
political, ideological, or religious reservations cannot always dictate
the operational decisions in the firm. However, it may serve as a "tie
breaker" where the employee's constitutional right balances out the
employer's constitutional right to property. It opens the possibility of
assessing the reasonableness and proportionality of the employer's
order. Where the employee's constitutional right is negatively
affected by an employer's order, the fact that it is plausible to view
such an order as "objectionable" (at the very least-that the employee
may rationally view it in such a manner) makes the employer's
business case, to attract customers and to prefer more competent
employees, less persuasive. The employee's constitutional right, in
other words, is the legal mechanism that enables restricting the
employer's practices to those that are not, on some interpretation,
objectionable.
V. THE REMEDY: PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATICS
On the face of it, the remedy sought by the plaintiff is irrelevant
to the legal analysis. According to accepted positivist wisdom, it
appears at the end of the syllogism that juxtaposes the facts of the case
with the legal norms, and yields a legal, normative decision. The court
then returns to the facts of the case and applies the normative
conclusion to the particular case at hand. In the present context, for
example, the court will consider, either implicitly or explicitly, the
relevant elements outlined above: the nature of the objection, the
identity of the employer, and the existence of a supporting right or
contract to the employee's case. Only then will the court turn to deal
with the remedy sought.
Legal realism contests this methodology. Realists suggest that
judicial decisions respond to "situation types"-the "distinctive
39. Labor Appeal 43/3-33 Sofer v. Dead Sea Indus. Ltd. Labor [1993] NLC 26(1), 169
(translation by author).
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factual pattern" - that determine the outcome. 4° Realists share the
"assumption... that judges-stimulated, primarily, by the fact before
them rather than by the rules to which those facts might be fitted-
work backwards, 'from a desirable conclusion to one or another of a
stock of logical premises'. ,
41
Though this position can easily be characterized as "judges decide
first, and rationalize later" or even as something along the lines of
"judicial decisions are based on judicial mood," it is, in fact, much less
exciting. It would simply mean that judges take into account, at the
very early stages, the consequences of ruling one way or the other and
that these consequences have an impact on their legal reasoning.42
For example, if we return to the matter of military CO that
opened this paper, the court's decision not to legitimate ideological, as
opposed to religious, CO may be explained by the practical need to
limit the range of grounds for objection, driven by the fear that
national security may be jeopardized if CO became the norm.43
In the context of the employment relationship, it is possible to
distinguish not only the final decision, but also the court's resolve, by
utilizing the remedy sought as a determining factor. Such an analysis
would suggest three levels of remedies.
First, and most problematic for the court to accept, is the
employee's insistence to continue to work under her terms. Since
none of the cases that deal directly with objectionable work include
this feature, it would be useful to expand the perspective and include
the related case of Daniel Ben-Simon v. Magen David Adorn
(MDA)." The plaintiff was a paramedic, employed by MDA, the
national provider of first aid services. Following years of negotiation,
MDA and the national workers' union signed a collective agreement
that required all employees to attach insignia designating their
personal rank in the organization. Ben-Simon asked to be exempted
from the obligation to wear the insignia, based on his CO, but this
request was rejected, and he filed suit. The fact that the court refused
to accept the claim is not surprising. It could have done so, quite
easily, by referring to the collective agreement and the reasonable
procedures that had taken place when assessing Ben-Simon's request.
40. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS 278, 281
(2001).
41. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 123 (1995) (quoting Max
Radin).
42. Stuart Macauly, A New Legal Realism: Elegant Models and the Messy Law in Action,
(Univ, of Wisconsin Law School, NLR Working Paper No. 2, 2008).
43. See Nehushtan, supra note 8, at 256.
44. Labor Case (Hi) 403/07 Ben-Simon v. Adorn [2007] (translation by author).
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The interesting aspect, for present purposes, was that the court briefly
noted these features of the case, and then moved on to state the
employer's managerial right to change the terms of employment
unilaterally (even though the issue in the present case was settled by a
collective agreement), as long as this is done in a proportional and
reasonable fashion. More importantly, the court concluded that there
was "no basis to the claim that the obligation to wear insignia violates
the petitioner's freedom of conscience."4 It is stressed that the court
does not state that the violation is reasonable and legitimate under the
circumstances, but rather suggests that no such violation exists.
Similarly, Freedland and Vickers give the example of a religious
individual who refuses to work with women. Though he would be
"virtually unemployable ... his religious freedom is not infringed by
his failure to find work ... His belief is protected by his freedom to
decline to be employed."'  It is submitted that a determining factor to
such an attitude was the fact that the employee sought measures that
would allow him to continue working under his particular conditions.
At the other end of the continuum is the Irit Aroussi case. As
explained earlier, this case did not involve two sides to an
employment relationship at all." The court was not asked to force
two sides into an employment relationship under certain terms. In
fact, the interaction between Ms. Aroussi and the clothing shop was as
limited as possible, and neither side expected the employment
relationship to continue. Moreover, even the monetary claim did not
seek extensive compensation from the private employer, but rather
minimal unemployment benefits from the government.' The court's
decision was a mirror image of the one in Ben-Simon. It may be
worthy to repeat the sentence that concluded a one-page description
of the facts: "it is clear that a person cannot be required to perform
work that would require him or her to perform offences according to
the tenets of the religion he or she lives by."49
45. Id.
46. Freedland & Vickers, supra note 7, at 619.
47. See text accompanying supra note 14.
48. For neo-liberal trends in Israeli unemployment insurance policy, see Zeev Rosenhak,
Globalization, Domestic Politics and the Restructuring of the Welfare State: The Unemployment
Insurance Program in Israel, in THE WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 79 (E. Benvenisti G. Nolte & D. Barak-Erez eds., 2004).
49. Labor Case 9465/05 (TA) Tzipy Yaacobi vs. Proportion Ltd. [2008] (emphasis added).
As noted, other criteria differentiate these two cases, the different ground for objection. The
fact that the courts are more receptive to religious objection was previously noted. This fact is
also manifested by a recent case, Reg'l Labor Court (TA) 4785/02 Kashni v. Mun. of Ra'anana
[2002] (Isr.), where plaintiff asked the court to invalidate the dismissal and to restore his
position. The plaintiff, an orthodox Jew, was employed in the municipal park and refused to
work on Saturdays. Even though his colleagues were willing to accommodate him by exchanging
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In between the two extremes, we find most of the cases: the
claim for redundancy payments (and, in recent years, minor punitive
damages) from the employer after the employee resigned. In
doctrinal parlance, at issue is whether the employer's refusal to
accommodate the employee constitutes circumstances that make it
unreasonable to expect the employee to continue to work. Under
Israeli law, only employees who are dismissed or who resign under
such circumstances, are entitled to redundancy benefits. However,
from a broader perspective, it is noted that many employers in Israel
tend to save for their employee's redundancy payments, and release
the money for the employee's benefit even if the employee resigns.
While this is not commonplace, the existence of the practice suggests
that, in the current context, requiring the employer to extend
redundancy payments in such circumstances is not overly
burdensome. This analysis may explain why the NLC in Palestine
Post5 ° and in Shemli51 struggled with the decision, but eventually
decided to award the redundancy payments. Similarly, when Ms.
Yaacobi was dismissed from Proportion for refusing to discuss the
plastic surgery that she had with potential clients, she was awarded
minor damages (20,000 NIS, or $5,000) in addition to the redundancy
payment, that she was entitled to by law.
A challenging new scenario may soon be added to this list. In
July 2009, a religious woman filed suit in the Tel-Aviv Labor Court
against an H&M franchise that was set to open shop in Israel.
According to the lawsuit, after a series of interviews with H&M
officials, the plaintiff was accepted for the position of commercial
manager, and was sent a contract of employment. 2 In the meantime,
the plaintiff was asked to accompany two senior H&M officials who
were scheduled to visit Israel, and she was expected to escort them to
Israeli shopping malls and other fashion stores. During the visit, the
officials asked to eat in restaurants and frequent nightclubs. The
plaintiff suggested several Kosher restaurants, that would enable her
to join the dinner, but declined to join them at night clubs. A few days
shifts, his manager dismissed him for his refusal. The court accepted the suit, reinstated him, and
awarded punitive damages.
50. NLC 93/3-223 Palestine Post vs. Yehiyel [1994] 27 PDA 436. To be precise, the
workers' contract entitled them to redundancy payments even if they resign, so the court did not
see the need to decide the matter conclusively. However, the NLC added that it was plausible
that if the facts of this case were different, the employees would have been entitled to
redundancy payments by law. Id.
51. NLC Judgments, Shemli v. Israeli Communist Party [1974] 6,42 (translation by author).
52. The following is based on the plaintiffs brief, which was forwarded to the author at his
request.
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later, the plaintiff was informed that she would not be employed with
H&M after all. According to the lawsuit, her refusal to join the senior
officials in non-Kosher restaurants and in nightclubs constituted an
irreconcilable "cultural gap" that prohibited H&M from employing
her. She filed for significant damages (400,000 NIS, or over $100,000)
for breach of contract and discrimination. At the time of writing, the
defendant has not yet responded. This case is unique not only in the
fact that it involves an employee who faces a prospective employer for
whom she only began to work, but also in the monetary compensation
sought, which exceeds in great measure the amount typically granted
in redundancy payments suits.
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS
Theorizing objectionable work case law in Israel is far from
trivial. There are very few cases but each has its own traits. This
paper focused on four of them: the grounds for viewing the
employer's order as objectionable, the identity of the employer, the
particular contract and additional rights involved, and the remedy
sought. Of course, each case involved its own combination of these
characteristics, which made it difficult to extrapolate a clear judicial
doctrine.
Yet, this caution should not be overstated. The character traits
noted above comprise the staple analysis of constitutional and
employment law. Their relevance is clear and, independently, they
are discussed in a thick body of case law and academic analysis. While
the objectionable work cases may require a distinctive approach, to be
developed over time, the judicial approach at the moment seems to
address them as a particular case in a general narrative, rather than a
sui generis phenomenon.
This still leaves a question unanswered: Why do so few cases of
objectionable work find their way to the courts? Is it really plausible
that the number of military CO cases exceeds the number of cases
brought by employees, even though the sanctions in the former
situation are potentially much more severe, and the number of
soldiers in the army is far lower than the number of employees in the
workforce? Another way of phrasing this question is to ask: What
really happens in the workplace (as opposed to the courts) in terms of
objectionable work? Assuming there are dozens, if not hundreds,
more cases of employees asked to perform duties that, because of the
sincere, comprehensive doctrines that they hold, they are far from
comfortable with, how do these matters get settled? In what
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percentage of cases do they simply give up, when do employers offer
them an alternative route, how often are employees forced to leave
their job (and do not sue), are unions involved in such dispute
resolutions, and if so--to what effect? All of these issues are well
worthy of more research.
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